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In the Sttprem.e Court of the 
State of Utah 
THE VALLEY MORTUARY, a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
UONEL FAIRBANKS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE NO. 7350 
J 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
The matters appearing in the Judgment Roll are set 
forth in extenso in the first 14. pages of Appellant's Brief, 
and reflect the background and basis for the issues involved 
on the appeal. For convenience of the Court in keeping 
clear the matters involved in the discussion, we shall, in this 
brief, refer to the parties by name; the defendant and ap-
pellant as FAIRBANKS and the plaintiff as THE V ALLEN. 
As we understand the pleadings, the record, and Fairbanks' 
brief, there is really only one question involved on this ap-
peal which arises as follows: 
Fairbanks, a m~rtician or undertaker, at Eureka, sold 
his establishment, stock in traQe, and good will, to The Val-
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ley for a consideration of $5,500.00 under a written agree-
ment containing, inter alia, a provision, that Fairbanks 
would not for a specified period operate a "mortuary or 
funeral business in Utah or Juab Counties, in his own name 
or through a subsidiary or third party." Fairbanks re-
ceived his money, turned the physical property to The Val-
ley, and left the restricted area. Sometime thereafter he 
sought and was granted a modification of the agreement 
. . . 
eliminating from the restricted area that part of Utah Coun-
ty lying north of Provo City. He then set up an establish-
ment and entered into a mortuary, funeral, or undertaking 
business in Orem, north of Provo. Shortly thereafter, in 
the operation of the mortuary business, Fairbanks began 
an invasion of Provo, Utah County south of Provo, and Ju-
_ab County, for undertaking business; receiving bodies, em-
balming, selling caskets, arranging and ·conducting funer-
als and burials in the restricted area. His activities in this 
regard continued to increase and expand until this action 
was commenced by The V.alley to enjoin Fairbanks from 
violating the restrictive clauses of his contract of sale, and 
as an incident, sought damages for the past breaches of con-
tract. The principal issue involved, the nub of the contro-
versy, the crux of the case, is as to whether or not injunc-
tive. relief is a proper remedy in the action. All other mat-
ters raised <;>r discussed are merely incidental to this ques-
tion. Fairbanks raises and argues this question in three 
of the five ·points (first,. third an~ fifth) discussed in his 
brief. Point 2 admittedly loses its significance if the 
action sounds in equity, and Point 4 consists. of a single. 
statement that in Fairbanks' opinion the Court did not give 
enough weight to some of his testimony. 
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POINT 1 
Is equitab\e or injrmctive relief a proper remedy for the 
Court to apply in this action? Fairbanks assails the 
injtmction: first, from a standpoint of pleading; second, 
as a 1natter of construction of the couh~ct. 
The question of pleading is posed by Fairbanks' con-
tention that the co1nplaint does not lay a basis for the inter-
position of the Court's equitable powers. Like many other 
activities of man, the art of pleading under common law 
gradually moved and degenerated itself into a formalism, a 
rule of thumb, a practice where a rule and not a reason was 
the guide. The pleader \Vas required to make his facts fit 
the stereotyped form of pleading, rather than the pleading 
fit the facts. The basis and objective of the code-the in-
novation brought about by it-was to make the facts and 
not the form the invoking power, the force that calls and 
brings into play the powers and facilities of the Court. A 
pleading is to be tested, not by its form, but by its content. 
It follows, therefore, that facts and not conclusions must 
be pleaded. It is from the factual substance, not the con-
clusions the pleader may have drawn, (hat a pleading must 
be tested. 
What must be alleged in a particular case depends upon 
what is essential to a cause of action in that sort of case. 
In any given case we are not helped much by references or 
citations to general rules of pleading. The application of 
such rules vary with the nature of the cause of action. We 
do not mould our facts to fit rules of pleading-we plead 
the facts, and then through the processes of legal reason, 
determine if the facts stated show a picture or condition 
which calls for the Court to determine the rights involved, 
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and to react in a certain way to achieve that purpose. 3 
Bancroft Code Pldg., 2553, ,4. The first question, therefore, 
as to the sufficiency of any pleading is: What is essential to 
a right of action in a case of that kind? The second ques-
tion: Are those essentials found within the pleading? 
Let us apply these tests to the pleading in the case at 
bar. In an action brought for violation of a contract tore-
frain from entering business in competition with the person 
to whom the viola tor of the contract has sold his business 
and good will, what facts are essential to show a proper 
cause or justification for the exercise of the equitable pow-
ers of a Court? In short-what facts must plaintiff plead 
in a case such as this to lay a foundation for injunctive re-
lief? He must show: An interest in the subject· matter; 
an invasion by defendant of a right plaintiff has therein; 
and facts from which the Court may say that equitable re-
lief is the most efficient and effective remedy to be applied 
in the situation to protect .the parties in their rights. 
It is not an uncommon practice to quote the old worn, 
hackneyed expressions that one must plead inadequacy of 
legal remedies, and irreparable injury before equity inter-
venes. Such expressions originated and became shopworn, 
if not hallowed, in the days and practice when law and 
equity were ~eparate and distinct, administered by sepa-
rate tribunals, under different rules of practice; and when 
equity was considered not a right but a benevolence of the 
King, which he could refuse or extend in those cases where 
the law and its procedure, because of its universality, was 
inadequate. With the adoption of our code, the distinction 
between legal and equitable forums, between legal and equi-
table practice, was abolished, and law and equity is now 
administered by the same Courts, in the same actions, be-
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t\veen the same parties, being parts of the same jurisdiction, 
and applied by tl1e Court as seems proper, to accomplish the 
results \Vhich the facts indicate the parties are entitled to, 
and which should therefore be the results of the action. 
Constitution of Utah~ Art. \Till, Sec. 19; Norbach vs. Board 
of Directors, 84 Ut. 506, 37 Pac. (2) 339; Spanish Fork West 
Field v. District Court, 99 Ut. 527, 104 Pac. (2) 353. 
It thus appears that the adequacy of the complaint is 
determined by this test: Are there facts stated from which 
the Court can say that suit for damages would not be an 
adequate, efficient and effective remedy to protect the 
rights plaintiff has under its contract? 
The complaint alleges and shows that Fairbanks sold 
a going bttsiness to The Valley for a substantial sum of 
money, and that part of the consideration The Valley re-
ceived for the money so paid Fairbanks was the good will 
of Fairbanks and of the business sold in the restricted area, 
coupled \vith a covenant by Fairbanks not to enter or en-
gage in competition with The Valley within the restricted 
zone for a specified time. It alleges in definite and positive 
terms that Flairbanks is actively and openly violating his 
restrictive covenant, injuring The Valley's business, and 
undermining the good will he had sold and for which he 
had been paid; and concludes with a prayer for an injunc-
tion; then for damages and costs. In an assault such as 
this upon the complaint those facts are admitted, as they 
are upon demurrer. (At the time the injunCftion was gran-
ted Fairbanks had answered, admitting he was operating 
a funeral business in the restricted area, arid alleging in ef-
fect that he intends to continue so to do. See paragraph 5 
and subdivisions (a) and (c) of Fairbanks' further and af-
firmative defense.) 
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Fairbanks states that the only basis for equitable re-
lief is the prayer, and that the prayer is not a part of the 
complaint. True, the prayer is not part of the allegations, 
but it is the assertion of the kind, nature, and extent of re-
lief plaintiff seeks; and the relief he can obtain is limited 
by the prayer. It is therefore to be considered by the 
Court in construing and interpreting the pleading, since the 
Court must determine whether the party has stated a case 
for the relief which he seeks. 
'"The character of the bill depends upon the prayer, 
which defines its objects, and points out the defend-
ants and the remedies and redress sought." 10 Ency. 
Pldg. and Prac. 961. 
The prayer serves to show the kind of relief to which 
plaintiff conceives himself to be entitled, and indicate the 
object which he seeks to accomplish. Arrington v. Liscom, 
34 Cal. 365, 94 Am. Dec. 722; Rochester v. Wells Fargo, 87 
Kan. 164, 123 Pac. 729, 40 U R. A. (N. S.) 1095. 
0. G. Merager v. Alex Turnbull, 2 Wash. (2d) 711, 99 
Pac. (2) 434, 127 A. L. R. 1142, 1151, a case involving a sale 
of undertaking business, the Court says: 
"The argument of appellants that the respondent's 
failure to raise in the pleadings or argue at the trial 
the issue of the right of Bruce Turnbull to use the new 
building precludes the relief of enjoining use of the 
building by Bruce Turnbull is answered by the prayer 
of respondent in his complaint for injunctive relief 
against both appellants and for such other and further 
relief as might to the court appear just and equitable 
in the premises. Under that prayer the trial court had 
the right to grant any and all relief which was deemed 
justified under the circumstances.'' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
Where the con1plaint sets out facts which will support 
either an action at la\v or a suit in equity, the character of 
the action may be determined by the relief demanded. Ency. 
Pldg. and Prac. 16; 777-8. 
"Where the facts stated entitle the plaintiff to 
elect between t\'vu remedies, to either of which the facts 
sho\V him to be entitled, the prayer may determine the 
character of the action, because it is in itself an elec-
tion. Corry v. Gaynor, 21 0 St. 277." 
"\Vhether a petition is at la\v or in equity is to be 
determined by the prayer and conclusion. Pella Chris-
tian Church v. Scholte, 2 Ia. 27." 
Where there are two statutes prescribing the same 
form of complaint in (1) an action for the recovery of 
money judgment and (2) an action foreclosing a lien for 
taxes, the prayer of the complaint will determine the nature 
of the action. People v. Mier, 24 Cal. 61. 
1 Bancroft Code Pldg. 35. The prayer may be consul- · 
ted in determining whether a pleading was intended to in-
clude any specific character of relief, or in interpreting the 
language of a complaint or petition. Where the facts may 
constitute two or more different causes of action, and may 
authorize different judgments, the prayer becomes signifi-
cant, and may determine the nature of the action. Aid ·v. 
Bowerman, 132 Wash. 319, 232 Pac. 297; Nevada County, 
etc. Canal Co. v. Kidd, 37 Cal. 282;· Arrington v. Liscom, 
34 Cal. 365, 94 Am. Dec. 722; People v. Mier, 24 Cal. 61. 
"In case the pleader has stated a cause of action 
in equity and also one at law in such a manner as to 
have it uncertain which one he intends to pursue, re-
sort may be had to the prayer for relief to determine 
the character of the action. Kinns v. Gaslin, 24 Neb. 
310, 38 N. W. 797." 
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The injunction here involved is not an injunction pen~ 
dente lite, but one entered after issue joined and full hear~ 
ing had, and submission of the cause upon the merits. 
There is no claim that the evidence before the Court did 
not, or does not, justify the injunction. The contention is 
that the complaint did not set forth facts showing the need 
of equitable restraints. Fairbanks argues the point as 
though the question were one a-rising upon a temporary 
writ issued upon the complaint, rather than a writ issued 
after trial upon the merits. We shall advert to this fact 
later. At the moment we shall confine ourselves to appel~ 
lant's position. 
For a pleader to say that "he has no adequate remedy 
at law" or that "his legal remedies are inadequate" adds 
nothing to his pleading; it states no facts and is merely a 
conclusion of the pleader .. 3 Bancroft Cook Pldg. 1548; 
McBride v. Newlin, 61 Pac. 577; 129 Cal. 36; McLean v. 
Farmers Highline Canal, 44 Colo. 184, 96 Pac. 16; Davitt 
v. American Bankers, 124 Cal. 99, 56 Pac. 775; Wicks v. 
Metcalf, 83 Ore. 687, 163 Pac. 434; L. R. A. 1918A 493. 
What he must show are the facts from which the Court 
may deduce conclusions with respect to what are proper or 
necessary .remedies. Utah Assn. Creditmen v. Jones, 49 Ut. 
519, 164 Pac. 1029; 3 Bancroft Code -Pldg. 1548; Schuyler 
v. Broughton, 65 Cal. 252, 3 Pac. 870; Van Buskirk v. Bond, 
52 Ore. 234, 96 Pac. 1103; Galbreath Gas v. Lindsey, 35 
Okla. 235, 129 Pac. 45. 
From the facts may not the Court conclude that 
damages would not be an adequate, an efficient or an ef-
fective remedy? 
In determining whether an action is a law case, or one 
sounding in equity, the Court looks at the plaintiff's right, 
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the grievance complained of, and considers the question: 
What is the proper and effective remedy to protect plain-
tiff in his rights? If an a\vard of damages, a money judg-
ment, will properly protect plaintiff's rights, the case is one 
at la\v; if such judgment would not a1nply protect plain-
tiff's rights and redress his wrongs, the action sounds in 
equity and the Court will administer its equitable powers 
to achieve the necessary, desirable and proper end. In ac-
tions under restrictive covenants in connection with the 
sale of a business, or of good will, the Courts uniformly 
hold that the action is equitable, and that the remedy at law 
is inadequate, and the continued injury in its nature irrep-
arable; that such conclusions are impelled from the type of 
the case and the wrong complained of, and need not be fur-
ther pleaded. In a recent case, involving the sale of an ab-
stract business, answering the same point raised here, the 
Court said: 
"It was not necessary, in this kind of case, for the 
plaintiffs to shov1 irreparable injury, or that they had 
no adequate remedy at law. Anderson v. Rowland, · 
18 Tex. Civ. App. 460, 44 S. W. 911; Goldberg vs. Sol-
tes, Tex. Civ. App.; 32 S. W. 2d 246; U>max v. Trull, 
Tex. Civ. App. 232 S. W. 861; Red Ball Stage Lines v. 
Griffin, Tex. C'iv. App.; 275 S. W. 454; Clay v. Richard-
son, Tex. Cl.v. App.; 290 S. \V. 235. We refer especially 
to the opinion in Anderson v. Rowland, supra. 
That plaintiffs need not prove the extent to which 
they have been injured by the violations of the contract, 
or that they have been injured at all, may be demon-
strated by stating that a threatened violation of this 
contract might have been enjoined, even though no 
violation had yet taken place, and though no injury 
had yet been· suffered. The purchasers of a business 
and good will, where the seller had agreed not to com-
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pete, are not bound to wait until the contract has been 
breached and the damage has been done before seek-
ing an injunction ... 
As is recognized by the authorities above cited, an 
injunction may be the only satisfactory relief available 
in a case of this kind. In no other way can plaintiffs 
obtain what they purchased from defendant." Moore 
v. Duggan Abstract Co., et al; 154 S. W. 2d 519, 520, 1. 
We. quote from Anderson v. Rowland, 44 S. W. 914: 
''The mere fact that a breach of the covenant is 
intended is a sufficient ground for the interference of 
the court by injunction. A covenantee has the right 
to have the actual enjoyment of the property modo et 
forma, as stipulated for by him. It is no answer to say 
that the act complained of will inflict no injury on him, 
or will be even beneficial to him. It is for the plaintiff 
to judge whether the agreement shall be kept, as far as 
he is concerned, or whether he will permit it to be vio-
lated. It is not necessary that he should show that 
any damage has been done. It being established that 
the acts of the defendant are a violation of the con-
tract, the court will protect the complainant in the en-
joyment of the right he has purchased. 2 High, Inj. 
Para. 1158." 
In Angier v. Webber, 14 Allen 211, 92 Am. Dec. 748, 
the Massachussetts court said: 
"For this violation of this covenant the plaintiff 
is entitled to relief in equity. An action at law will fur-
nish no adequate remedy. The damages are, in their 
nature, such as not to be susceptible of proof or exact 
computation, and the injury caused by the acts of the 
defendants is a constantly recurring one, for which 
multiplied suits at law would afford but an imperfect 
remedy. 2 Story, Eq. Para. 925; 2 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 
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1760; Williams v. Williams, 2 Swanst. 253.'' To same 
effect 2 High, Inj. (3d Ed.) Para. 1142-1158. 
In Lutz v. Vlestern Iron and Metal Company, 190 Cal. 
554, 213 Pac., on page 965, the court states thus: 
"From the nature of the situation the injury or 
da.rnage that \vill accrue to respondent if appellants are 
permitted to do the threatened acts in the name at-
tempted to be appropriated is plain. A pleader is not re-
quired to describe in extenso by a superfluity of \Vords 
a result that must inevitably follo\v, provided the prem-
ises of a stated proposition be acceded to. Can there 
be any doubt as to the natural and logical effect the 
competition described in the complaint would have on 
respondent's business?" 
The same court, in Moore v. Massini, 32 Cal. 595, says: 
"Should the threat be fulfilled the plaintiff vvould 
be deprived of a part of the substance of his inheri-
tance \Vhich could not be specifically replaced * * * 
the injury is irreparable in itself. Inasmuch as plain-
tiff's rights to the remedy by injunction has its origin 
in the nature of the injury complained of, it was of 
course, unnecessary to aver matters merely adventi-
tious." 
The court goes on to point out that where a threatened 
injury goes to the substance of plaintiffs rights, not the 
equivalent of money, it is irreparable by the definition of 
that term. 
In Charles T. Granger v. Lawrence L. Craven, (159 
Minn. 296, 199 N. W. 10) 52 A. L. R. 1356, the court said: 
''We do not so far forget that the usual and most 
important function of courts of justice is rather to 
maintain and enforce contracts than to enable parties 
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thereto to escape their obligation on the pre.text of 
public policy, unless it clearly appears that they con-
travene public rights or the public welfare. James 
Quirk Milling Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 98 
Minn. 22, 116 Am. St. Rep. 336, 107 N. W. 742, follow-
ing Baltimore & 0. S. W. R. Co. v. Voiget, 176 U. S. 
498, 44 R. ed. 560, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 385. 
. We consider that public policy requires the en-
forcement of this contract as the parties wrote it, ·rath-
er than judicial permission for another surgeon to 
practice in Rochester. 
If defendant had bought out the plaintiff, he cer-
tainly would have exacted a covenant preventing plain-
tiff from re-entering practice in competition with him. 
That is, he would have protected his newly purchased 
good will from invasion by its former possessor. That 
sort of a covenant, otherwise reasonable, has never . 
been successfully challenged. 
It would be most uncomplimentary to defendant 
to suppose that he would not, were he to open an of-
fice in Rochester, attract to himself at once and auto-
matically, a substantial number of plaintiff's patients. 
* * * That consideration shows both the proprie-
ty of the restrictive covenant, and the sureness with 
which irreparable injury to plaintiff will follow unless 
defendant is restrained by injunction from a breach 
of that covenant. We need no evidence to show that 
substantial injury would follow othenvise, and it would 
be the kind of injury for which the legal remedy is in-
adequat.e. (Boldface ours.) 
There is so much authority on this subject that 
any attempt here to review it is prohibited by propri-
ety. The task has been admirably performed in the 
annotations appearing in 9 A. L. R. 1456 and 20 A. L. 
R. 86. The latter supplements and ·brings down to 
date (1922) the former. 
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reasonable degree, \Vhere damage beyond the power 
of la\v to prevent or make good is reasonably sure to 
follo\v a breach of the protecting ·covenant, its breach 
should be prevented by injunction. This is such a 
case.'' 
The rule is laid down in 43 C. J. S. 567, as follows: 
"Where a nestablished business has been sold with 
its good \vill, and there is a valid covenant not to com-
pete, a breach is regarded as the controlling factor, 
and injunctive relief follo\vs almost as a matter of 
course. In such cases the damage is presumed to be 
irreparable, and the remedy at law is considered in-
adequate." See also: Peterson v. Johnson Nut Co., 
204 Minn. 300, 283 N. W. 561; Malakoff Gin Co. vs. 
Riddlesperger, 108 Tex. 273, 192 S. W. 530; 32 C. j. 
217, note 11 and 12." 
Where the injury complained of is one which is in its 
nature irreparable or one which from its nature damage is 
not an adequate remedy, allegations of irreparable injury 
for inadequacy of legal remdy are unnecessary. Cal. Jur. 
Vol. 14, para. 66; Burris v. Rodriguez, 22 Cal. App. 645, 
135 Pac. 1105. In Cal. Jur. 67, it is said: 
"If the ultimate facts pleaded warrant the grant-
ing of an injunction, or the ultimate facts proved war-
rant the granting of an injunction, it is the duty of the 
court to grant such relief." 
We may summarize this matter in a series of terse 
statements- from 10 Encyc. Pldg. and Prac, as follows: 
"P. 943. Whether the bill shows a plaintiff en-
titled to relief must be considered with reference to 
the nature, character and condition of the. property or 
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rights to be protected. Citing Shipley v. Ritter, 7 Md. 
408. 
P. 952. An injury is irreparable when it is of such 
a nature that the injured party cannot be adequately 
compensated therefore in damages, or when the dam-
ages which result therefrom cannot be measured by 
any certain pecuniary standard. 
In determining what is an irreparable injury re-
gard is had not only to its magnitude but to its char-
acter and it is irreparable in the sense herein when the 
plaintiff could not be considered as in the same posi-
tion after a money judgment as he was had the wrong 
not been committed. There are rights which though 
exercised over property and dependent on it, the vio-
lation of which cannot be adequately redressed by any 
recovery of a mere surn of money. See Jones v. Bran-
don, 60 Miss. 556. 
P. 9554. By the term 'The inadequacy of the rem-
edy by damages' is meant that the damages obtainable 
at law are not such a ·compensation as will in effect, 
though _not in. specie, __ p)2,ce the parties in the position 
in \Vhich they formerly stood. The fact that the 
arnount of damages cannot be accurately ascertained 
may constitute irreparable damage. The question in 
all cases is whether the remedy at law is under the cir-
cumstances of the case, full and complete. See West-
ern Union Tel. v. Rogers, 42 N. J. Eq. 311. 
The test to the right of equitable interposition is 
not merely that there is a remedy at law; but it must 
be plain and adequate, as practical and efficient to the 
ends of justice and its prompt administration as the 
remedy in equity. Erwin v. Louis 50 Miss 363. 
The irreparability of a wrong is a conclusion 
which the law draws from the character of the wrong, 
and where the character of the wrong is exhibit~d in 
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a statement of the facts which constitute it, it is for· 
the court to detern1ine from the character of the act 
whether- it is irreparable. See cases cited P 954. 
We look at the particular acts charged and threat-
ened, and the circumstances under which they were 
done and threatened, to discover \vhether the damages 
from them might be irreparable." Sidner v. Ha\V 
Creek Tunrpike 91 Ind. 186; Cooper v. Hamilton 8 Blac. 
F. (Ind. 377) 
The court examines the facts charged and the na-
- ture and the character of the injury which may be in-
flicted by the acts complained of and thus determine 
whether the injury may be irreparable, vel non. Puck-
ette v. Hicks 39 La. Ann.- 901. 
Page 945. It is sufficient that facts are alleged dis-
closing that plaLntiff is entitled to injunction without 
alleging that the injury will be irreparable or the plain-
tiff will be without any adequate remedy at law. Weiss 
v. Jackson County, 9 Ore. 470; Rood v. Mitchell Coun-
ty, 39 Ia. 444; Martin v. Jewell, 37 Md. 350. 
Page .962. On the final hearing the court m~y de-
cree a perpetual injunction, if it is necessary for com-
plete ju-stice, although not prayer for in the bill. San-
derlin v. Backster, 76 Va. 299, citing Kerr inj. 637. 
Page 962. An injunction may be granted on the 
final hearing under a general prayer for relief. 
Gaines v. Hale 26 Ark. 168. 
African Me. Church v. Conover, 27 N. J. Ek. 137. 
Fairbanks argues the contract does not use the words, 
"good will" as part of the property sold to Valley. Con-
tracts such as this one are generally construed as covering 
and including the good will. If they were otherwise con-
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strued, what would the purchaser gain by the restrictive 
covenant? 
The California Court in Shafer v. Sloan, 3 Cal. App. 
335, 85 Pac. 162, held that in a contract for the sale of a 
business, a stipulation not to reengage in the business for 
a fixed time, manifested an obvious intention of such con-
tract to sell the good will of such business. In Wall v. Chap-
man, 84 Okla. 114, 202 Pac. 303 and. 304, we read: 
"It is contended the contract does not refer to the 
'good will' and the Court cannot read that into the 
contract. This contract like all others must be inter-
preted so as to give effect to the mutual intention of 
the parties. The same kind and character of contract 
was upheld by this Court in Threlkeld v Steward 24 
Okla. 403, 103 Pac. 630, 138 Am. St. Rep. 888." 
The identical· kind and character of contract was 
before the Court of Appeal of California, being Shafer 
v Sloan 3 Cal. App. 335, 85 Pac. 162. The Court in the 
third syllabus stated as follows: 
The obvious intention of a contract for the sale 
of a business, coupled with an agreement by the seller 
not to engage in the business so long as the buyer con-
tinues in the business is to sell the good will of the busi-
ness. ·under the facts pleaded and the contract itself 
it is apparent it was the intention of the parties that 
the sale of the good will of the business was within the 
terms of the contract." 
In Yost v. Patrick, 245 Ala. 275, 17 South (2) 240, 44, 
the Court says; 
"It is not essential that the contract for the sale 
of a business expressly include the good will thereof. 
Covenants designed, in the nature of them, to protect 
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the good will of the business being sold, imply a sale 
of good will.'' 
To the same effect see Maddox v. Fuller, 233 Ala. 662, 
173 South 12; Davs v. Christopher, 219 Ala. 346, 122 South 
406; Smith v. Webb, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1191, 4, 40 South 
913, 176 Ala. 596; Nelson v. Johnson, 38 Minn. 255, 36 N. 
W. 868, 9. 24 Am. Jur. 810 gives a positive statement of 
the rule as above stated and host of citations. Anno. 18 
Ann. Case 433; Anno. Ann. Cass. 1917A, 1015 ff. 
It seems to us that it does appear from the com-
plaint that the injury complained of cannot be compensated 
in damages, and that it further appears that the remedy at 
law would not be an efficient remedy, from the fact that it 
clearly appears from the complaint, and the answer, that 
the wrong complained of is a continuing wrong, and if an 
action for damages had to be relied upon it would neces-
sarily work a multiplicity of suits; this court, in common 
with all other courts, has decided that where an injury is 
a continuing one an injunction is the proper remedy. The 
statement of facts set forth in the complaint conclusively 
shows an injury and damage to the plaintiff. And from 
the facts stated in this complaint it is so-evident that the 
plaintiff would be damaged and the money judgments would. 
afford no adequate protection, and that the acts complained 
of, without injunction, will be continuing ones, that further 
argument on the subject would be idle. See Silver v. Wash-
ington Inv. Co., 65 Wash. 576, 118 Pac. 749; Galbreath Gas 
Co. v: Lindsey, 35 Okla. 235, 129 Pac. 45; Sickles v. Man-
hattan Gas Light Co., 64 How. Proc. (N .. Y.) 33. 
If the facts stated in this complaint do not entitle Val-
ley to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the Court and to re-
ceive the negative and preventive relief of injunction, then 
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a statement to obtain such relief must needs be one either 
replete with conclusion of the pleader or be filled with a 
pleading of evidence. The Valley is without an adequate 
remedy at law. A court of law could not prevent Fairbanks 
from continuing the violation of his contract, as his answer 
and defense indicates he intends to do, nor could it restore 
the Valley to the position it would have were the restrictive 
covenants observed; and the damages which the Valley 
would sustain in the future by being faced with the business 
competition of Fairbanks, in violation of his covenant, 
would not only require a multiplicity of suits but would im-
pose upon Valley the constant duty of seeking to recover 
damages, the amount of which is difficult to ascertain, and 
could not with any certainty be estimated. We conclude 
with a statement from Dingley v. Buckner, Sheriff, 104 
Pac. 480: 
"In reply to the criticism of respondent that there 
is no allegation of the insolvency of defendant, it is 
sufficient to say that this is a false quantity where it 
appeared in legal contemplation that the damage is 
irreparable." 
We submit the following additional citations as con-
taining some terse and well reasoned statements and law 
upon the matter: Crutchett v. ~awton, 139 Cal. App. 411; 
33 Pac. (2) 839; Herrington v. Hackler, 181 Okla. 396 74 
Pac. (2) 389; Youngman v. Calhoon, 321 S. W. 647. 
Annotations: 58 A. L. R. 156-75; 3 A. L. R. 242; 82 
A. L. R. 1033; 91 A. L. R. 985; 31 A. L. R. 1174 supplemen-
ted in 12 Pac. (2) 990; 99 Pac. (2) 434; 133 Pac. (2) 291; 
127 A. L. R. 1152; Rowe v. Toon, 185 Ia. 848, 169 N. W. 
38; Lashus v. Chamberlain, 6 Ut. 385, 24 Pac. 188. 
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POINT 2 
Question of Jury Trial 
Another point noted, but scarcely argued by Fair-
banks, is the fact that the court denied a jury trial. The 
brief apparently concedes that if the action was primarily 
equitable then ·the court committed no error in denying a 
jury. We think, in view of what has been said in this brief, 
there can be no question but that the action was primarily 
equitable for injtmctive relief, and the matter of damages 
merely incidental to the main purposes of the suit. Had 
a jury been en1paneled, its verdict \vould only have been 
advisory and could have been disregardedby the court. We 
quote from The California Court of Appeals in Meek v. 
Delatour, 2 Cal. App. 264, 83 Pac. 300, where the court 
says: 
''In such a case the verdict of the jury would be 
advisory only, and neither party is entitled to a trial by 
jury as a matter of right. Richardson v. City of Eu-
reka, supra; Fisher v. Zumwait, supra. The demand 
for damages is but incidental to the main purpose of 
the suit (Courtwright v. Bear R. W. & M. Co., supra); 
but, if it should be conceded that defendant may have 
been entitled to have the question of damages deter .. 
mined by a jury, no such demand was made; but the 
demand was for a ]ury to try the entire case. 
It is not error to refuse a general demand for a 
jury to try a cause consisting of legal and equitable 
issues. 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 975; Greenleaf 
v. Eagan, 30 Minn. 316, 15 N. W. 254; Lace v. Fixen, 
39 Minn. 46, 38 N. W. 762; Peden v. Cavins, 134 Ind. 
494, 34 N. E. 7, 39 Am. St. Rep. 276." 
In the light ·of the legal reasoning and of the legal au-
thorities as shown in the preceding pages of this brief, we 
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think it is definitely established that this action is primar~ 
ily equitable; that it is basically an action for injWlction 
and not for damages. If Fairbanks has been violating the 
restrictive provisions of his contract it see1ns plain that the 
only effective and efficient remedy to prevent continuance 
of such breach is by an equitable interposition, judgment 
for damages could not be presumed to stop further breachM 
es, nor could it be presumed to place The Valley in the po-
sition it would have been were there no breaches of the 
contract. In the light of these conditions, we see no escape 
from the conclusion that the action is one in equity. If 
Fairbanks is breaching his contract, The Valley is entitled 
to injtL'1ctive relief as of course. If Fairbanks is not breachM 
ing his contract, The Valley would not be entitled to a judg-
ment for damages. Since Valley must prove its right to in-
junction before it can make any kind of a show of its rights 
to damages, it must follow that the action sounds in equity 
and that damages are merely incidental to and dependent 
upon the determination of the equitable issues in favor of 
The Valley. The action must therefore be held primarily 
one for injunction and the right to darnages. merely inci~ 
dental to, and dependent on, Valley's right to injunctive re-
lief. In such cases, the parties are not entitled to a jury 
trial on the question of damages. 50 C. J. S. 751; Monmeier 
v. Mcc·anister, 153 S. C. 422, 8 S. E. (2) · 737, 129 A. L. R. 
880. Upion Oil v. Rleconstruction ·Oil, 20 Cal. App. (2) 170, 
66 Pac. (2) 1215. Bellavance v. Plastic C'raft, 30 F. Supp. 
37. 
. Where the facts are not conceded and trial is neces-
sary to determine plaintiff's right to the equitable relief 
demanded, the court may retain jurisdiction and assess the 
damage, even if plaintiff does not prove a case for injunc-
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tion. Miller v. Edison Electric, 184 N. Y. 17, 76 N. E. 734, 
3 L. R. A. N. S. 1060, 6 Ann. Cass. 146. Tucker v. Edison 
Electric, 91 N. Y. S. 439, 100 App. Div. 407, affirmed 76 
N. E. 1110, 184 N. Y. 548. 
In the instant case, since The Valley proved and estab-
lished its primary right to equitable relief, the Court had the 
right to assess the damages without a jury and therefore no 
prejudice resulted to Fairbanks and no error was committed 
by the Court in denying his motion for a jury trial. Incident-
ally, we again call attention to the authorities supra to the 
effect that had Fairbanks been entitled to a jury, which he 
was not, on the question of damages, the Court was justi-
fied in denying his demand which was made for jury trial 
of the whole cause and not merely of the damage issue. 
POIN'T 3 
Interpretation of the Contract 
Fairbanks contends in Point 3 that the contract only 
bound him not to build or maintain within the restricted 
area a physical plant in which he would conduct a general 
undertaking establishment and business; that as long as 
he did not maintain and operate the physical plant-the 
building commonly called an undertaking parlor or a fun-
eral home-within the restricted area, he was free to en-
·gage in all the activities in which morticians, undertakers, 
embalmers and funeral directors usually engage; in other 
words, he could run free competition to The Valley within 
the area as long as he kept his building outside of the area. 
A simple statement of the proposition is its own answer 
and establishes its inconsistency and incongruity. The 
Court takes judicial notice of the fact that in these days of 
free movement, good roads, and fast and easy travel, the 
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undertaker is not confined in his business to the narrow 
limitations of a single community; that the corpse is no 
longer washed, embalmed and kept in the home by "wake" 
until time for the obsequies; that the usual practice is for 
the undertaker to remove the body promptly after death 
to an establishment specially fitted and equipped for con-
venience in performing the duties he must. perform in prep-
aration for the final obsequies and interr.oent of the body. 
The court will also judicially know that it is the common 
practice for the undertaker (mortician, he now prefers to 
be called) to provide convenient and comfortable transpor-
tation for the family of deceased to his establishment or 
other convenient place for selection of caskets, clothes, etc.; 
and that he generally procures the death certificate, the 
burial permit, and makes the arrangement for the grave. 
In the instant case Fairbanks testified that he genarally did 
all those things; that they were included in his services and 
charges. After Fairbanks has done all these things for de-
ceased, or the family, \Vha t remains for the person who 
bought the business to do? But that is not all: he also 
claims the right to conduct the obsequies, direct the funeral 
procession and inter the body. The only thing he does not 
claim the right to do is to speak the funeral sermon. All 
other things he claims he may do, as long as he does not 
maintain an embalrning house, his physical plant, within the 
restricted area. 
We presume The Valley would have no cause for com-
plaint, nor make any, if Fairbanks built a mortuary build· 
ing in every town of the district, as long as no business was 
done therein. Fairbanks sola to Valley a physical plant, 
a stock of goods, and a going business, with its good will, 
and he covenanted that he would not operate or engage in 
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the "mortuary or funeral business" \vithin the restricted 
area. Good will is an incident to business; it is part of the 
intangible assets of a business; it cannot be segregated or 
sold apart from the business, because it does not exist apart 
from the business. 24 Am. Jur. 804, 5; Anno. Ann. Cass. 
1914 B 879; Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., v. Salt Lake Co., 60 Ut. 
491, 512, 210 Pac. 106, 27 A. L. R. 874. It cannot attach 
to or be a· part of- the building; it cannot pass by a sale of 
real estate. Its value as an element of value in the pur-
chase qf a business lies in the fact that the seller thereby 
eliminates himself as a competitor, so the purchaser can 
build his trade free from competition with the seller. Many-
Courts say the seller is obligated not only to refrain from 
competition but to use his influence if occasion presents to 
recomrnend to his trade or patrons or customers that they 
deal with the purchaser. 
For the court to construe the contract as Fairbanks 
now contends would require it to make a new contract for 
the parties. Fairbanks agreed not to operate or engage in 
the "mortuary or funeral business." In his brief he gives 
one of the definitions of the word "funeral", but he does not 
define ''funeral business.'' This term is defined as all- busi-
ness done in procuring the interment of a corpse. See Vol. 
2, Bouvier, 1329; also Black's Law Dictionary. · Mortuary 
is defined inter alia as pertaining to the burial of the dead; 
"it is applied to many subjects connected with death ·and 
burial." Ency. Brittanica Vol. 15. The New York Court 
in People v. Ringe, 110 N. Y. S. 923, 1235 · App. Div. 572, 
holds that a funeral covers the matter of disposition of bod-
ies of human beings after death, or the work of the under-
taker. A mortician is an undertaker; a mortician's business 
is an undertaker's business; an undertaker's or mortician's 
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business is the business of doing the thing, or rendering the 
services, or parts of them, connected with the disposal of 
the dead bodies of human beings from death to interment. 
City of Tucson v. Arizona Mortuary, 34 Ariz. 495, 272 Pac. 
923. 
The agreement involved in this action provides that 
Fairbanks will not operate or engage in the mortuary or 
funeral business. It is urged that the Court should disre-
gard the word business and construe the provision as just 
prohibiting a physical plant. There is no rule of interpre· 
tation that sustains this view. Business does not mean a 
building, or stock, or machinery, or capital, or caskets and 
the like. While business pertaining to the dead cannot be 
done without these, in commercial language it is as distinct 
fron1 them as labor is from capital. In speaking of the 
business that may be done by a mortician, undertaker, or 
funeral director, the mind does not contemplate or dwell 
upon the character, or quality of the means used, but upon 
the operations, whether great or small, complex or simple, 
numerous or few, for one or the other of these conditions 
may arise from much or little stock or capital. In other 
words, business does not mean caskets, coaches, embalming 
fluids or the like. Business is not these lifeless and dead 
things, but the activity in which they are employed. When 
in motion, then the owners or actors are said to be in busi-
ness; and then it is that undertakers and others speak of be· 
ing in business. Business denotes the employment or ac-
tivity in which one engages to make a living for profit. 
The testimony of Fairbanks narrating his activities with-
in the restricted_ district and the charges he made there-
for, certainly manifests that he was engaged in it for 
profit; it is not consistent with the thought of it being a 
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charitable act. In Ragsdale v. Nagle, 106 Cal. 332, 39 Pac. 
628, a seller sold his abstract business and good will, agre~­
ing not to carry on a similar business. The court held that 
searching for titles \vas a business and enjoined the same. 
If the contract were construed as Fairbanks would have it, 
the whole restrictive clause would by nugatory, and an ab-
surdity. 
POINT 4 
}latter of Testimony 
The remaining point; number 4, in Fairbanks' brief, is 
the statement that the Court disregarded the testimony of 
vvitnesses for the defendant that had the services of Fair-
banks not been available to them they would not -have given 
their funeral work to The Valley. We are unable to say 
from a· perusal of the judgment of the Court that he dis-
regarded such testimony, because the Court does not indi-
cate whether he did or did not disregard it; whether he did 
or did not consider it. However, we think the Court was 
justified in, and shoUld disregard it because the testimony 
was wholly irrelevant and immaterial. Furthermore, if the 
Court did disregard the testimony, and if he should have 
regarded it, the judgment should still be affirmed. This 
being an equitable matter, the Court may try the' matter 
here de novo on the reeord, and we think if the Court did 
so it would come to the same conclusions as the trial court, 
except, we believe, Valley was entitled to a greater judg-
ment for damages than was awarded by the trial court. 
The measure of damages recoverable for breach of the cov-
enant such as that herein involved, is the value of the busi-
ness lost to the plaintiff. As indicated in the authorities 
cited before in this brief, such damages are difficult of 
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measurement, and many courts have said that itself is amp-
ly sufficient to make the case one in equity and to lay full 
basis for injunctive relief. Generally such damages are 
largely speculative, like damages a warded in tort cases f<?r 
pain and suffering. There is no gauge by which they can 
be measured with any certainty whatever, but that does 
not detract from a right to recover damages, although it 
may be added reason why the court and not the jury should 
determine them. Cooper v. Anchor Securities, 16 Wash. 2d 
306, 133 Pac. (2) 291, is a case passing upon the measure 
of damages in a case involving breach of restrictive coven-
ants such as here and cites other leading cases on the sub-
ject. We also direct attention to the annotation on that 
question in Ann. Cass. 1914 A on Page 1153, where the 
courts indicate the elements that enter into such measure-
ment. 
Citing Lashus v. Chamberlain, 5 Ut. 140; 13 Pac. 361. 
See also Merager v. Turnbull, 2 Wash. 711, 99 Pac. (2) 434, 
127 A. L. R. 1154 
We submit that The Vlalley in its complaint stated an 
action primarily and essentially in equity, with a claim for 
damages for past breaches incidental to its case for injunc-
tive relief; that upon the trial The Valley amply sustained 
the burden of proof upon every issue; that Fairbanks failed 
to show any meritorious defense, that his pleading and his 
own testimony conclusively establish that The Valley was 
~ntitled to the injunction and to their damages, even in a 
larger amount than the trial court a warded; that there is 
no error appearing in the record, on the part of the trial 
court, unless it be in 'the smallness of the damages a\varded 
against Fairbanks for his willful and deliberate breach of 
his covenants and that the judgment should be affir1ned. 
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The books are replete with cases where parties have 
sold their business, their good will, and entered into a cov-
enant, for \Vhich they received valuable consideration, to 
refrain from entering into business in competition with the 
person to whom they had sold their business and good will, 
and then repenting of \Vhat they had done, or, as here, de-
liberately disregarding their covenant. In such cases the 
courts have uniformly enjoined further breaches and usu-
ally made an award of damages, all in equity. Fairbanks 
ventures the suggestion that he should not be held to his 
contract because he thinks now he may have made a poor 
bargain, and that to hold him to the contract might be hard 
on him financially. That question, too, has been raised be-
fore, and the courts have said, in sound logic, that is no 
ground for relief. See Yanka v. Goldberg, 110 N. J. Eq. 
170; 137 Atlantic 645; Dellacorte v. -Gentile, 98 N. J. Eq. 
194, 129 A.tl. 739; Streeter v. Bush, 25 Calif. 68, 72. See 
note on page 890 of 138 Am. St. Rpts. 
Fairbanks may think that he sold his birthright for 
a mess of pottage, but it is not recorded in Holy Writ that 
the other Esau was allowed to, or ever tried, to welch on 
his bargain, and we submit that the Court is not going to 
let Fairbanks do so either. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAL,LAS H. YOlJNG 
MARTIN M. LARSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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